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[Appearing below are excerpts from an article by Eric Shultz of the Honduras Information Center,
distributed on 04/14/88 by the Central America Resource Network (Palo Alto, Calif.)] The larger
context of the April 7 riot in Tecugicalpa, resulting in the destruction of the US consulate, several
vehicles, and five deaths, can be summarized as follows: 1) The Honduran military, which holds
effective state power, finds its alliance with the Reagan administration in jeopardy as the contra
policy crumbles, drug networks unravel, and the Reagan's term comes to an end. 2) Human rights
abuses, the military's means of controlling dissent, have become a political issue and have attracted
international attention. Repression against the Church, unions, peasant organizations, and other
popular organizations increased markedly in the fall of last year. 3) Rural poverty, the source of
the most fundamental political conflict in Honduras, is growing more acute. Peasant activism is
likely to increase, and the traditionally-timid Catholic Church has become more outspoken. Reagan
administration policy in crisis: The Iran-contra scandal marks a transition in US policy towards
Central America. The ascendancy of the Democrats in Congress corresponds to the successes of
the Central American peace process as expressions of the same change. In Honduras, the civilian
government was created largely as a buffer to the military, which has played a central role in
the policies now in decline. By instituting the national security doctrine (involving systematic
extra-judicial repressive violence), harboring the contras, and generally collaborating in regional
US politico-military intervention, the Honduran military has bound its fate to the success and
survival of the Reagan policy. As that policy crumbles, the Honduran armed forces find themselves
attacked from several sides. Next, the Sandinistas' mid-March offensive against the contras,
besides proving the latter's weakness, reminded the world that the contras have their bases in
Honduran territory in open violation of international law (and the Central American peace accords).
Nicaragua has reopened its suit against Honduras in the World Court and has the law on its side.
Further, Honduran military officers' involvement in drug trafficking has made headlines in the
international press, though no one has yet been indicted. In February, witnesses incriminating Gen.
Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama brought up the Honduran connection. Anonymous Honduran
civilian and military officials have told the Honduran media that Matta's capture and deportation
was in fact part of a deal with the State Department to protect the Honduran high command.
Besides the trouble they face in international courts of justice (see below), top leaders of the
Honduran military now find themselves exposed before the intensifying anti-drug consciousness in
Washington. On human rights: In the Inter-American Court on Human Rights of the Organization
of American States in San Jose, Costa Rica, the Honduran state faces charges for the crime of
political disappearances. The Honduran Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CODEH)
and Committee of Relatives of the Disappeared are acting as advisors to the prosecutor, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, which is also a body of the OAS. The prosecution's case is
very strong in this precedent-setting case. The main body of evidence was heard last October and a
verdict is expected this June. In both cases, the Honduran government is charged with responsibility
for crimes primarily committed by the military. Especially in the latter case, a guilty verdict would
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put the government in the position of having to sanction the armed forces. Real power relations
imply that the civilian leaders will be in a tight squeeze between the intransigence of military power
and the sanctioning powers of the UN and OAS. Agrarian struggle: Only Haiti and Bolivia can rival
Honduras in terms of economic catastrophe in the hemisphere. Over half of the economically active
population is unemployed. Of 4.5 million Honduran citizens, nearly two-thirds are campesinos
(peasants), of whom nearly 150,000 families (not individuals) are landless, and another 400,000 own
sub-subsistence plots (1 to 3 hectares). The rural situation has worsened in the last decade, and
remains the fundamental problem for this agrarian nation. Historically, only military regimes have
advanced the agrarian reform process in Honduras, since only the military has enough power,
but such regimes are exceptions to repression-as-usual. Both civilian administrations of the 1980s
have overseen setbacks in the agrarian reform process. In Central America, the progressiveness of
Honduran agrarian reform legislation is second only to Nicaragua. But the Honduran government
lacks the will to implement the laws. Campesinos resort to popular justice, organizing themselves
to recover available land. After occupying land they ask for legal title through the National Agrarian
Institute (INA). As the law is on the campesinos' side, in moments of organizational strength and
at favorable political junctures, they are sometimes successful. But large landowners can often
persuade local military detachments to act before campesinos' legal petitions can be processed.
The INA's style of work is popularly known as tortuguismo (tortoise-ism), as it often takes two
to five years to act on petitions. On May 20, 1987, the four main campesino organizations (UNC,
ANACH, FECORAH and CNTC) carried out an unprecedented nationwide joint action, recovering
60,000 hectares and occupying the eight INA regional offices. Their chief political objective was
to force out the INA director, Mario Espinal. Their unity cracked and they backed off on that
demand, losing momentum. In the end, the campesinos were evicted from all but 7,000 hectares,
and 463 are in jail or facing charges (mostly violations of Decree 33, an omnibus "anti-terrorist"
law enacted in 1981). During the past year, the rural crisis has grown more acute. Last fall's second
harvest failed in most of the Honduran interior, causing pockets of outright famine in the south,
where hunger has long been widespread. In the aftermath of the May 20 actions, Hondurans often
observed that the campesinos were losing their fear of repression. As a militant organization with
a strategy of direct action, the CNTC (National Federation of Rural Workers) provided leadership
for May 20. Repression of the CNTC has been intense, and while its members remain militant, the
more conservative groups are now timid about joining it in united actions. Even without a united
campesino front this year, agrarian conflict will be intense. By design, land recoveries coincide with
the start of the planting season (April and May), and a political movement for the ouster of Espinal
(INA) was mounting when the April 7 riot and subsequent state of emergency took place.
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